Metaphysical Principles of Causality and Normativity in Historical Cognition
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.47451/phi2025-10-01Keywords:
causality, normativity, free will, objective universal laws, necessityAbstract
This study is timely in the context of the contemporary reassessment of the foundations of scientific rationality, the crisis of classical determinism, and the necessity of accounting for normative structures in historical cognition. Amidst methodological pluralism and increasingly complex conceptions of freedom of human action, the analysis of the metaphysical principles of causality and normativity acquires particular significance. An awareness of the multidimensionality of human activity demands the integration of causal and value-based foundations in the explanation of historical processes. The novelty of this study lies in proposing an integrative approach that unites causal and normative structures as two fundamental metaphysical principles of historical cognition. The study explores the contemporary interpretation of freedom as a creative act that disrupts the causal chain, and it demonstrates the methodological irreducibility of normativity to causality. The subject of the study is the correlation between the metaphysical principles of causality and normativity within the structure of historical cognition. The object of the study is human action as an element simultaneously incorporated into both the causal and normative orders. The study aims to identify the roles of causality and normativity in the formation of historical explanation models and in the philosophical understanding of free will. The methodological basis of the study includes analysis, synthesis, historical-genetic and comparative methods, as well as phenomenological, hermeneutical, and dialectical approaches, which allow for a comprehensive understanding of the evolution of the categories of causality and normativity. The application of metaphysical analysis and conceptual reconstruction ensured the identification of a link between changes in scientific rationality and the transformation of historical models of thinking. The study traces the evolution of causality and normativity: from primitive normative syncretism and ancient conceptions of fate to the classical scientific model built on the continuity of causal connections, and its subsequent critical reassessment in the 20th century. It is shown that historical cognition is impossible without considering normative structures, which define the subject’s motivation and responsibility, and that contemporary philosophy is turning towards an integrative model that combines explanation and interpretation. The main challenges addressed by the study are related to the limitations of universal deterministic explanations and the difficulty of formalising normative structures. An additional problem is the gap between natural-scientific and humanistic models of rationality. The study confirms that causality and normativity prove to be complementary principles essential for the complete reconstruction of the historical process, which opens up prospects for the further development of an integrative philosophy of history.
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